"If I could do it, it ain't art." —Red Green
There's a discussion on Kevin's and Ben's blogs about whether there's any objective standard for art. I like to watch movies, and I've spent a lot of time thinking about what makes a movie good. Some movies that I feel like I should like but don't; others I like for exactly the reasons I hate another. And while there are some movies that almost nobody appreciates, there aren't really any movies that almost everyone appreciates. Can art itself really be "good" or "bad", or is it all in our heads?
To say that art is "good" or "bad" implies a purpose to the art that it either meets or falls short of. The high-level purpose for anything we would call art is to be appreciated by somebody. To know what people will appreciate, you have to understand people, so I don't think any criteria can be universal (i.e. we have no idea what kind of movies aliens would appreciate). But if any qualities are shared by all of humanity, they have potential to become a foundation for objective artistic principles, not objective in the sense that outside observers could agree about what is artistically valuable, but that they could agree about what humans would find artistically valuable.
You might be tempted to point to brain structures we have in common as examples of "shared qualities", but the human brain is designed to be extremely adaptable. Similarities in "artistic taste" are rare, and subtle differences in taste can have a big effect on how we evaluate a particular song or painting.
If you could agree on criteria, evaluating a specimen would become a much more objective process. The subjective part is deciding on the criteria. But some things intrinsically imply a particular purpose. A metal plate on a door in place of a handle suggests a purpose to be pushed, not pulled. If something suggests a purpose and then fulfills its suggested purpose, then it is "good" in a more "objective" way than something that doesn't suggest a purpose. By the same token, something that fulfills some purpose extremely well is more "objectively good" than something that doesn't really fulfill any purpose. The very fact that it works for some purpose suggests using it for that purpose (once that purpose is discovered). That said, we can find a purpose for almost anything, but some things have so much order to them that they're nearly perfect for one clear purpose and nearly useless for anything else (e.g. computer software).
Movies and television depend very heavily on understanding the purpose. That's why TV sitcoms use a laugh track to cue the viewer in to look for a joke. A bad movie can become a hilarious joke, and then from that vantage point become a great movie (okay, maybe not for everyone).
My conclusion is that when we say some art is good, we usually mean that there's some purpose it's good for. When people disagree, they usually disagree on the grounds that they don't value that purpose, and therefore that it's no purpose at all. The criteria are subjective on some levels and objective on others. Consequently, I don't think it's accurate to call art either purely subjective or purely objective.
Showing posts with label relativism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label relativism. Show all posts
Friday, April 3, 2009
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
The Effects of Morality
Today's question: What does morality do?
If I tell someone that I don't believe in any sort of morality, I tend to get a response of shock and "moral panic". After the shock wears off, the arguments range from "how do you get out of bed in the morning?" to "that's what destroyed the Roman Empire". The consensus seems to be that if everyone were like me, the results would be terrible. So, I ask you, what are you afraid of?
Is it something physical? You might be afraid that without morality, our societies would destroy themselves in a civil war of greed. If that's what morality gives us, what separates it from mere practicality, or "advanced common sense"? What you're really afraid of is not that I'm discarding spiritual truth, but that I'm not smart enough to predict the consequences of my actions. It's a valid concern, but a physical concern.
Is it something emotional? Are you afraid that without a sense of universal good and evil, everyone would become depressed, apathetic drones? Then what separates morality from psychoactive drugs? It may be a natural remedy, and it may help me not depend on others for emotional support, but it doesn't have eternal, universal significance.
Is it something spiritual? Are you concerned for my soul? As I read it, Christian salvation doesn't come from morality, but from belief. Righteous behavior flows out from belief in God, but where does a belief in morality itself fit into the equation? If I don't believe in God, what spiritual difference would it make if I valued morality?
Maybe morality has some of those effects, but also has deep significance for other reasons. But then the shock and fear have nothing to do with its significance. If that's your stance, I can't argue, but don't pretend the fear is righteous. It's just pragmatic.
Please say what you mean, and stop hiding behind vague terminology and intellectual laziness. What you're hiding from is personal responsibility.
If I tell someone that I don't believe in any sort of morality, I tend to get a response of shock and "moral panic". After the shock wears off, the arguments range from "how do you get out of bed in the morning?" to "that's what destroyed the Roman Empire". The consensus seems to be that if everyone were like me, the results would be terrible. So, I ask you, what are you afraid of?
Is it something physical? You might be afraid that without morality, our societies would destroy themselves in a civil war of greed. If that's what morality gives us, what separates it from mere practicality, or "advanced common sense"? What you're really afraid of is not that I'm discarding spiritual truth, but that I'm not smart enough to predict the consequences of my actions. It's a valid concern, but a physical concern.
Is it something emotional? Are you afraid that without a sense of universal good and evil, everyone would become depressed, apathetic drones? Then what separates morality from psychoactive drugs? It may be a natural remedy, and it may help me not depend on others for emotional support, but it doesn't have eternal, universal significance.
Is it something spiritual? Are you concerned for my soul? As I read it, Christian salvation doesn't come from morality, but from belief. Righteous behavior flows out from belief in God, but where does a belief in morality itself fit into the equation? If I don't believe in God, what spiritual difference would it make if I valued morality?
Maybe morality has some of those effects, but also has deep significance for other reasons. But then the shock and fear have nothing to do with its significance. If that's your stance, I can't argue, but don't pretend the fear is righteous. It's just pragmatic.
Please say what you mean, and stop hiding behind vague terminology and intellectual laziness. What you're hiding from is personal responsibility.
Labels:
morality,
relativism
Monday, February 16, 2009
The Next Step
I want you to imagine something...
One day someone hands you a book, and tells you, "You need to read it. It's the next step." You ask, "...what for?", and are met with a blank stare. "It just is! It's the next step."
Later that day, a lady tells you, "I believe it's the next step to sing 'I Am the Walrus'." "Oh..." is all you can manage. She looks at you in disbelief. "Well, why aren't you doing it?"
At lunch, you realize your wallet's at home and ask your friend to spot you 10 bucks. Feeling adventurous, you try, "I think it's the next step...". His face is screaming in shock. "How can you say that?! It's failure! Total failure!"
What's missing?
One day someone hands you a book, and tells you, "You need to read it. It's the next step." You ask, "...what for?", and are met with a blank stare. "It just is! It's the next step."
Later that day, a lady tells you, "I believe it's the next step to sing 'I Am the Walrus'." "Oh..." is all you can manage. She looks at you in disbelief. "Well, why aren't you doing it?"
At lunch, you realize your wallet's at home and ask your friend to spot you 10 bucks. Feeling adventurous, you try, "I think it's the next step...". His face is screaming in shock. "How can you say that?! It's failure! Total failure!"
What's missing?
Labels:
relativism,
traditions
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Moral Relativism - Part 3
If someone's beliefs point to some type of morality, then I have no business judging or interfering. But many people seem to actually put the need for some kind of morality ahead of the existence of a particular system, and furthermore require that the criteria of right and wrong are universal and unambiguous. They claim that without a system of guidelines, everyone will sink to the worst depths of depravity, and every society will tear itself apart. They teach everyone to fear and distrust anyone who doesn't avow at least some morality, and that anything is better than nothing in this respect. This attitude goes far beyond a loyalty to their own doctrine of morality, and firmly asserts that even if all other particular beliefs turn out to be false, some other morality must save us from the war of all against all; the very idea of moral relativism must be a logical contradiction and so-called relativists must be fools.
Morality is supposed to be a system for guiding behavior. Without some explicit brand of morality, what would be left to guide a person's actions? We still have reason, emotion, social conventions, and some would claim free will and an internal moral compass. These may not add up to a universal system, but it is certainly some kind of means for guiding behavior. Someone who demands some further moral standard is saying not just "I have extra/alternative criteria" but "those criteria are not enough". Usually, the accusation comes in a stronger form, that "those criteria are worthless or even harmful". Another angle is "even if those criteria are enough to keep the peace, they're just a soulless copy of true morality". I could address each claim individually, but I'll just summarize that yes, it's tough being ethical and responsible, nobody does it perfectly, and I also don't think just any given moral system gives life meaning, even if some particular system might. In other words, it's not true that anything is better than "nothing", even if some particular thing might be better.
On the other side, young people seem to look to moral relativism as some sort of refuge from any responsibility that excuses them from any sort of social judgment, and others judge relativism along these lines. I consider such an attitude insane and irresponsible, and not a valid conclusion from the premise of moral relativism. However, not everybody window shops for a nice conclusion and picks a justification to match. I'd love to move the discussion away from emotional outrage, fear, and disgust and towards clarity and understanding. I'd also love for atheists to stop clinging to universal morality when they can't make a coherent argument for it.
Morality is supposed to be a system for guiding behavior. Without some explicit brand of morality, what would be left to guide a person's actions? We still have reason, emotion, social conventions, and some would claim free will and an internal moral compass. These may not add up to a universal system, but it is certainly some kind of means for guiding behavior. Someone who demands some further moral standard is saying not just "I have extra/alternative criteria" but "those criteria are not enough". Usually, the accusation comes in a stronger form, that "those criteria are worthless or even harmful". Another angle is "even if those criteria are enough to keep the peace, they're just a soulless copy of true morality". I could address each claim individually, but I'll just summarize that yes, it's tough being ethical and responsible, nobody does it perfectly, and I also don't think just any given moral system gives life meaning, even if some particular system might. In other words, it's not true that anything is better than "nothing", even if some particular thing might be better.
On the other side, young people seem to look to moral relativism as some sort of refuge from any responsibility that excuses them from any sort of social judgment, and others judge relativism along these lines. I consider such an attitude insane and irresponsible, and not a valid conclusion from the premise of moral relativism. However, not everybody window shops for a nice conclusion and picks a justification to match. I'd love to move the discussion away from emotional outrage, fear, and disgust and towards clarity and understanding. I'd also love for atheists to stop clinging to universal morality when they can't make a coherent argument for it.
Labels:
relativism
Friday, January 16, 2009
Moral Relativism - Part 2
Every idea, whether or not it's accurate, is based on other ideas, itself, some mixture of the two, or nothing. Relativism has a lot to do with ideas and implications, so I'll say a little on that subject before I get back to why it's important.
Because ideas are only anchored to each other, all ideas are ultimately "floating in space" in a sense, and the entire corpus of human knowledge is not "well supported" as a whole. Put another way, the "infallible" process of logical deduction (applying what we know) is worthless without the "fallible" process of logical induction (predicting what's "probably" true).
There are, however, ideas well worth believing. Bertrand Russell says, "the point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it". This is the trick to all of our ideas: our basic, fundamental assumptions are so simple or necessary that it's not worth considering the alternatives. For instance, many of our ideas are based on reliable sensory experiences. If our sensory experiences are so misleading that there's no way to follow them to the "real truth", then the "real truth" will be irrelevant until that changes. It doesn't matter if everything is a dream unless and until we wake up or find a good reason to question it all. So there is a legitimate basis to many ideas, just not one that's supported by evidence, technically speaking.
Now back to relativism. It's my contention that you can't get from a moral statement to a non-moral statement. The implications of a moral statement ("X is good") are also moral statements ("we should do X", "there's not enough X"...). The nearest thing to non-moral conclusions would be explicit responses ("I will do X"). These responses also depend on other moral statements ("I do things that are good"), and they have a decidedly non-universal sense to them. Moral statements can also be related to God in significant ways ("God wants me to do X"), but that only extends the "moral statement bubble" as opposed to penetrating it, because they're still a type of moral statement and lead to more of the same ("God says to do good", "God is good", I will do what God says to do").
My belief is not that God-based morality is empty or flawed, or even that it's necessarily on equal footing with moral relativism, but that relativism is no more self-defeating or contradictory than moral universalism. Neither system minimizes the personal responsibility to make decisions, act on one's convictions, or seek the truth, although relativism leaves a few extra unknowns as far as how to go about it.
Because ideas are only anchored to each other, all ideas are ultimately "floating in space" in a sense, and the entire corpus of human knowledge is not "well supported" as a whole. Put another way, the "infallible" process of logical deduction (applying what we know) is worthless without the "fallible" process of logical induction (predicting what's "probably" true).
There are, however, ideas well worth believing. Bertrand Russell says, "the point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it". This is the trick to all of our ideas: our basic, fundamental assumptions are so simple or necessary that it's not worth considering the alternatives. For instance, many of our ideas are based on reliable sensory experiences. If our sensory experiences are so misleading that there's no way to follow them to the "real truth", then the "real truth" will be irrelevant until that changes. It doesn't matter if everything is a dream unless and until we wake up or find a good reason to question it all. So there is a legitimate basis to many ideas, just not one that's supported by evidence, technically speaking.
Now back to relativism. It's my contention that you can't get from a moral statement to a non-moral statement. The implications of a moral statement ("X is good") are also moral statements ("we should do X", "there's not enough X"...). The nearest thing to non-moral conclusions would be explicit responses ("I will do X"). These responses also depend on other moral statements ("I do things that are good"), and they have a decidedly non-universal sense to them. Moral statements can also be related to God in significant ways ("God wants me to do X"), but that only extends the "moral statement bubble" as opposed to penetrating it, because they're still a type of moral statement and lead to more of the same ("God says to do good", "God is good", I will do what God says to do").
My belief is not that God-based morality is empty or flawed, or even that it's necessarily on equal footing with moral relativism, but that relativism is no more self-defeating or contradictory than moral universalism. Neither system minimizes the personal responsibility to make decisions, act on one's convictions, or seek the truth, although relativism leaves a few extra unknowns as far as how to go about it.
Labels:
formal logic,
relativism
Moral Relativism - Part 1
Ethics and values and morals, oh my! It's time to throw caution to the wind and discuss relativism. Before I do, though, I'll need to invoke my muse and put all my energy into doing this just right. The internet is full of discussions about relativism, and as far as I can make out, it's all either horse poo or extremely boring. I'm going to try my best to keep this and any further posts manageable and well-organized. Here goes...
What difference does it make being a relativist? Does a relativist believe that whatever makes you feel good is "right"? If you see a relativist on the street, how will you know? Think hard about those questions, and don't jump to the easy answers right away, because they're the focal point of the idea of moral relativism.
I make the claim that relativism itself makes very few direct prescriptions, and only provides a few vague implications. It's a mental model for understanding "moral propositions", or statements involving words like "good", "bad", "righteous", "evil", "right", "wrong", "should", and "ought". Yes, it's all just about words, and that can be frustrating, but words make up such a big part of our lives that sometimes they deserve a second look.
Consider the statement "exercise is good". How do you respond to such a statement? You might get up and go for a walk, eat a piece of cheesecake out of defiance, or make an excuse for not exercising. If you have no response whatsoever, and immediately forget the statement, what purpose does it serve? It might still make someone else feel good to say it, or fill a gap in conversation. If, on the other hand, nobody has any response to a statement, in what sense does it still have value? Probably not in much of a practical sense. I take the position that a statement only has practical value if it affects some feeling or behavior, either immediately or down the road.
That in no way berates moral claims themselves or makes people stupid for holding moral beliefs. There is usually a very strong response to moral statements. However, it makes our relationship with such statements a little more explicit. That's not the essence of relativism, but it's a foundation for further argument, and if we can come to agreement on this point then it'll help keep the rest of the discussion sane.
What difference does it make being a relativist? Does a relativist believe that whatever makes you feel good is "right"? If you see a relativist on the street, how will you know? Think hard about those questions, and don't jump to the easy answers right away, because they're the focal point of the idea of moral relativism.
I make the claim that relativism itself makes very few direct prescriptions, and only provides a few vague implications. It's a mental model for understanding "moral propositions", or statements involving words like "good", "bad", "righteous", "evil", "right", "wrong", "should", and "ought". Yes, it's all just about words, and that can be frustrating, but words make up such a big part of our lives that sometimes they deserve a second look.
Consider the statement "exercise is good". How do you respond to such a statement? You might get up and go for a walk, eat a piece of cheesecake out of defiance, or make an excuse for not exercising. If you have no response whatsoever, and immediately forget the statement, what purpose does it serve? It might still make someone else feel good to say it, or fill a gap in conversation. If, on the other hand, nobody has any response to a statement, in what sense does it still have value? Probably not in much of a practical sense. I take the position that a statement only has practical value if it affects some feeling or behavior, either immediately or down the road.
That in no way berates moral claims themselves or makes people stupid for holding moral beliefs. There is usually a very strong response to moral statements. However, it makes our relationship with such statements a little more explicit. That's not the essence of relativism, but it's a foundation for further argument, and if we can come to agreement on this point then it'll help keep the rest of the discussion sane.
Labels:
relativism
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Dear Typical Atheist: Please Stop Embarrassing Us
Firstly, science does not unequivocally prove your case for atheism. Science, as a collection, is not a mass of truth or facts, but a mass of data. It's messy, it's ambiguous, and most of it is either outright wrong or just an approximation. You don't own Science, it's not your God, and if it happens to be in your favor it's only a matter of probability, not certainty.
Next, you don't sound as smart as you think repeating again and again that you don't believe the Bible because it's full of contradictions, and you look downright stupid making an official list of them. Wikipedia's full of contradictions, and so are you. My favorite example, Proverbs 26:4-5, is a litmus test of small-mindedness:
4 Do not answer a fool according to his folly,
or you will be like him yourself.
5 Answer a fool according to his folly,
or he will be wise in his own eyes.
These verses are adjacent! Do you really think that this "contradiction" just slipped through the proofreading? Does this really have any bearing whatsoever on whether the Bible is worth believing?
In my opinion, most of the Bible is not very significant because it's not reasonably falsifiable: there are too many "escape clauses" and too few risky predictions. There are a few decent examples of self-contained arguments against the Bible's credibility, but for the most part you're not going to point to a group of passages in the Bible and raise many eyebrows, Christian or atheist.
There's one perspective that's only shared by agnostics and Christians, never atheists, but needs to be called out nonetheless: that it's impossible to be atheist because you can't prove God doesn't exist, and therefore there are only agnostics and believers. This claim is exactly as absurd as the reverse, that you can't be Christian because you can't prove beyond all doubt that God does exist (regardless of which perspective is better supported by evidence).
There's a similar attack stating that you can't really be a relativist because the statement "everything is relative" would have to be absolutely true, but again that perspective confuses two levels of assertion: the assertion itself (P), and the assertion that P is undeniable or absolute. I can easily state that I have no reason to believe anything is absolute. I'll save the relativism debate for another post, though.
Labels:
atheism,
level-crossing,
proof,
relativism,
science
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