First let's see how things look to a subjectivist:
Subjective Outlook
In this model, there's an objective truth that underlies all shared experience (meaning things that almost all humans have in common, such as biological humanity, our location in the universe, and especially the things considered painful or pleasurable). The body of human knowledge floats on top of this layer of experience, so it's also indirectly supported by truth. If the details of human experience were significantly modified, any bit of knowledge might be invalidated or become nonsensical. Different people can agree on qualities of human experience, such as moral values, because of a shared vocabulary and shared experience, but calling these shared values objective, universal truth is only accurate in a weak sense, as a form of conversational shorthand.
Now let's look at a world of objective values:
Objective Outlook
In this case, some knowledge is supported directly by truth, without being filtered through human experience. Everyone can agree on objective values, because they aren't supported only by the details of human experience, and they have universal significance outside of human experience. This implies that humans have a special kind of direct access to truth, such as divine revelation or an internal moral compass.
2 comments:
David,
Interesting way to say it. It reminds me of some horrible arguments I've had with Randian Objectivists who argue that values and morals are objective because tehy can be rooted in fact. As you rightly note, the fact that facts play into the formation of values is nowhere an argument for objective morality, unless it can be shown that certain facts lead DIRECTLY AND INEXORIBLY to certain moral conclusions.
My read on the situaiton is that certain moral precepts may also be rooted in a very common "human nature" that we all have. (Alonzo Fyfe would disagree, I'm sure.) Just as we are biologically constituted to see certain wavelengths of color and be able to infer others thoughts in social situations, I think it is not a stretch to suppose that certain basic moral sentiments (aversion to witnessing others in pain) may be biologically based.
This, as you note, is not an argument for objectivity of morals, but it may at least move to explain how significant moral agreement (at a basic level) can be consistent with moral subjectivism.
It reminds me of some horrible arguments I've had with Randian Objectivists...
Yeah, Rand's philosophy seems to be a form of utilitarianism, and most utilitarians seem to make the same argument that their philosophy is based "unambiguously" on fact, and therefore is 100% objective. Ayn Rand has some great ideas and it's a shame she takes such issue with us subjectivists. In my terminology, utilitarianism and Rand's "objectivism" are systems of ethics, and subjectivism is a theory of (non-)morality.
My read on the situaiton is that certain moral precepts may also be rooted in a very common "human nature" that we all have.
Absolutely. There's an interesting part in Douglas Hofstadter's GEB where he explores the relationship between communication and a common background. He asks what you could send along with a message to an alien to help it decode your message properly. There isn't much, and the exceptions (e.g. symbols based on physics) prove the rule.
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